Taip yra dabar, o ne anksčiau.

Nu gal, nesiginčysiu. Čia kiniečių savininkų problemos ką ir kaip daryti, kur dizainą projektuoti.

Taip, kad Volvo liktų Volvo, jį turi projektuoti švedai.

panasu kad korekcija baiges and naftos stocku

Prikabintos bylos

stai kaip atrodys situacija 2030 naftos fronte.

⚡ 1. The structural setup for 2030
By 2030, global oil supply faces three simultaneous pressures:

High‑risk companies lose 20–60% of production
(BP, Shell, U.S. shale independents, Canadian oil sands)

Medium‑risk companies stay flat
(Woodside, Chevron, Exxon, Equinor)

Low‑risk companies grow modestly
(Aramco, ADNOC, Petrobras, QatarEnergy)

But the net effect is still negative supply growth.

Global supply shortfall by 2030:
5–8 million barrels/day
This is equivalent to:

losing all U.S. shale growth, or

losing Saudi Arabia’s spare capacity, or

losing the entire North Sea

This is why the price impact is structural.

📉 2. Demand in 2030
Even with EV growth, global demand remains strong:

aviation

petrochemicals

shipping

heavy transport

developing economies

industrial uses

IEA, OPEC, and Rystad all project 103–106 mb/d demand in 2030.

📊 3. The 2030 oil price model (structural decline scenario)
Scenario A — Mild decline (–5 mb/d supply gap)
OPEC+ fills part of the gap

U.S. shale slows but doesn’t collapse

Demand grows modestly

Price range:

$95–120 per barrel
Scenario B — Moderate decline (–6–7 mb/d gap)
OPEC+ cannot fully compensate

U.S. shale plateaus

Non‑OPEC majors shrink

Price range:

$ 120–150 per barrel
Scenario C — Severe decline (–8+ mb/d gap)
BP/Shell upstream shrink faster

U.S. shale declines sharply

Canadian oil sands stagnate

Megaproject delays compound

Price range:

$150–180 per barrel
Scenario D — Shock scenario (geopolitical + structural)
If structural decline overlaps with:

Middle East disruption

Russia supply loss

Major refinery outages

Rapid demand growth

Price range:

$180–220 per barrel
This is not the base case, but it is possible.

🧠 4. Why structural decline pushes prices higher
Oil prices rise when:

supply falls

demand stays stable

spare capacity shrinks

inventories tighten

decline rates accelerate

megaprojects are delayed

All of these are happening simultaneously.

This is why analysts call 2028–2035 the “structural bull market window.”

🛢️ 5. How companies behave under each scenario
🔴 High‑risk companies (BP, Shell, U.S. shale independents)
Production falls

Cash flow stays high (due to high prices)

Share prices stagnate or drift sideways

Dividends remain strong

They become yield stocks, not growth stocks

🟠 Medium‑risk companies (Woodside, Chevron, Exxon)
Production stable

Cash flow rises

Share prices outperform high‑risk peers

LNG exposure boosts resilience

They retain growth premium

🟢 Low‑risk companies (Aramco, ADNOC, Petrobras, QatarEnergy)
Production grows

Market share expands

They become global supply anchors

Strong long‑term valuations

🧩 6. Final takeaway
✔ Structural underinvestment → structural supply decline
✔ Structural supply decline → structurally higher oil prices
✔ 2030 price range: $95–180, depending on severity
✔ High‑risk companies shrink but don’t necessarily crash
✔ Medium‑risk companies outperform
✔ Low‑risk companies dominate global supply
This is the most likely macro environment for 2030.

Niekas nezino realios situacijos su nafta, nes niekas tiksliai nezino kaip nafta susidaro.

Tai gali but tupai atsinaujinantis resursas.

Vyraujanti hipoteze kad nafta kazkada susidare nuo dinozauru laiku ir baigsis, yra hipoteze. Niekas negali taip paprastai istyrinet visu zemes viduriu ir juo labiau stebet visus apykaitos procesus kurie ten vyksta.

Naftos baubas stumiamas vardan zaliosios energetikos promotiono.

Nothing personal, just business.

Cia neina kalba apie naftos trukuma zemeje. Cia eina kalba apie energetikos kompaniju nesugebejima po 3-4 metu aprupint nafta pasaulines rinkos nes ju telkiniai seni, isseke, iranga sena, infrastruktura sena, nauju greziniu nedaro, neinvestuoja, save kanibalizuoja per didvidendus, kapitalas plaukia ne i ateities gavybos uztikrinima o i dabarties investoriu malones patenkinima per divus ir buy backus. Investicijos nedaromos net palaikyt dabartine gavyba, jau nekalbant apie ateities.

Cia tikriausiai vienas is geriausiu komodu sektoriu investuot ateinantiems 5 metams, nes klausimo ar nafta kils nera, yra tik klausimas kaip greitai ta pamatysim.

Zalioji energetika tokiam fone aisku irgi zaliuos, nes kai nafta brangi ir js yra trukumas, tai dujos, anglis, solar, wind ir pan subujos kaip rezultatas. Bet naftos negali pakeist su solar, nes is solar nei trasu gausi nei kelius nutiesi

pamatysim gerokai vėliau nei tie penki metai.

IEA ir kai kurie analitikai prognozuoja, kad pasaulinė naftos paklausa gali pasiekti piką iki 2030 m., ypač dėl elektromobilių plėtros. Tuo tarpu OPEC laikosi labiau optimistinės pozicijos ir teigia, kad aiškių paklausos piko ženklų nėra, todėl tikisi tęstinio augimo

Prikabintos bylos

Kaina turi pradet kilt jau siais metais. Ji jau buvo pradejus kilt ir rado dugnus kaip tik del strukturiniu problemu, o ne del geopolitikos, , veliau Iranas baimes ivare ,marketas issigandes repricino nafta ant full shortage scenarijaus. Dabar gryzom i tuos lygius nuo kuriu strukturinis kainos augimas prates kelione up, nepaisant geopolitikos.


Timingas gerai paaiskintas cia:

⭐ 1. The underinvestment problem: what actually happened
Global upstream oil CAPEX peaked in 2014.
Since then:

investment fell ~50%

shale growth slowed

conventional discoveries collapsed

offshore megaprojects were delayed

ESG pressure reduced long‑cycle investment

national oil companies under‑invested

demand kept rising

This created a structural supply gap that takes 5–10 years to show up.

We are now at the point where the gap becomes visible.

⭐ 2. The three phases of structural oil tightness
Phase 1 — Invisible tightness (2015–2020)
Supply growth slows, but inventories and shale hide the problem.

shale boom masks decline

offshore projects still finishing

demand growth modest

prices oscillate

no one notices the structural deficit

This was the “calm before the storm.”

Phase 2 — Emerging tightness (2021–2025)
This is where we are now.

Signs:

inventories trending lower

OPEC spare capacity shrinking

shale productivity flattening

offshore projects limited

demand still rising

price spikes during shocks (Ukraine, Middle East)

refiners running at high utilisation

This is the period where oil becomes jumpy, reacting violently to any disruption.

We are living this right now.

Phase 3 — Visible structural shortage (2026–2030)
This is when the underinvestment becomes impossible to hide.

What happens:

OPEC spare capacity approaches zero

shale plateaus or declines

non‑OPEC supply stagnates

demand still grows (India, SE Asia)

inventories fall to critical levels

price spikes become persistent, not temporary

governments panic about fuel security

inflation re‑accelerates

central banks become trapped

This is the phase where oil doesn’t just spike — it reprices.

Not a spike to $150.
A structural shift to $150–$200 as the new normal.

This is the analogue to 1973–74, but driven by supply, not embargo.

⭐ So when does the real‑world pain begin?
Here’s the timing in plain language:

2024–2025:
Volatility, price spikes, refinery bottlenecks, geopolitical sensitivity.

2026–2027:
Supply gap becomes visible.
Inventories fall.
OPEC spare capacity nearly gone.
Shale stops growing.
Prices grind higher.

2028–2030:
Full structural shortage.
Oil reprices.
Governments panic.
Inflation re‑accelerates.
Central banks become constrained.
Gold and commodities enter secular bull markets.

This is the period where the underinvestment problem becomes real life, not theory.

⭐ Why this timing is so predictable
Oil supply is slow:

offshore megaprojects take 7–10 years

conventional fields decline 4–6% per year

shale declines 20–40% per year

new discoveries are at record lows

CAPEX has not recovered

demand is still rising

This creates a mathematically unavoidable supply gap.

You can delay it with shale.
You can mask it with SPR releases.
You can hide it with OPEC cuts.

But you cannot escape it.

⭐ Final synthesis
The structural oil shortage caused by underinvestment begins to show up now, becomes undeniable by 2026–2027, and becomes a full‑blown macro driver by 2028–2030.

This timing aligns with:

sticky inflation

negative real yields

fiscal dominance

gold’s 1972‑style consolidation

commodity tightness

geopolitical fragmentation

Which is why the macro environment today looks so much like 1972–1973.

Nafta turi ko gero geriausia elioto vaizda is visu komodu. Downtrendai nukapoti, pratestuoti, nieko kito nelieka kaip tik up ateinancius 5 metus

Prikabintos bylos

Jei ne geopolitines baimes, tai naftos kelias butu buves toks. Taip kad tie visi karai ir Trumpas marketui tik triuksmas, ir nieko daugiau-uzspaikina, gryzta atgal ir vel eina savo keliu

Prikabintos bylos

Short term 5 bangu nuo dugno ignoruot negalima-tai trendo pokycio zenklas, ir po korekcijos, kokia ji bebutu ir kiek betruktu, kaina turi eiti up.

Prikabintos bylos

"Bet naftos negali pakeist su solar, nes is solar nei trasu gausi nei kelius nutiesi"


Tai nafta ir kitos energijos rusys yra realiai solar derivatyvas, plius derivatyvas uzkonservuotos silumines energijos zemes viduriuose.

Nes visi tie naftos susidarymo procesai vyksta kaitinant saulutei biosfera, be kurios niekas nebutu imanoma.

O tiesiogiai ivaldyt saules energija kaip rodo praktika, labai problematiska. Nes uzstatyt panelem didelius plotus ir juos priziuret, tai yra ka veikt.

Todel visa ta solar ateityje isvis gali nueit naxui manau, nes aptarnavimo kastai ten dideli, o nauda siaip sau.

Solar turi utilizacija tik kosmose, zemeje ji greiciausiai nepritaps. Pabandys zmones 100+ metu, gal pasieks 30% efektyvuma, bet greiciausiai bus nukonkuruota kitu energijos rusiu, iskaitant nuclear. O dideli zemes plotai bus reikalingi miestams, o ne solar fermoms.

Bet tai nereiskia kad artimiausiu metu(10+ metu) solar nesubujos. Kaip nekaip tai yra greiciausiai gaunama energija-gali per 24 valandas pastatyti personalia elektrine ko negali su kitom energijos rusim. Brangstant komodam solar bus viena is alternatyvu palaikyt zemas energijos kainas

Aptarnavimo kaštai, tai kas ? Dulkes nuvalyt?

Nafta pagal Kennedy

Prikabintos bylos

solar gal gale metu bus BUY

Prikabintos bylos

Rbob Gasoline beveik prie topo. Visi distilatai praktiskai arti ATH arba jau yra ATH(Heating Oil pvz). Nepaisant zemos naftos kainos, gatava produkcija jau pricinta naujuose lygiuose.

Prikabintos bylos

naftos kaina aukšta.......