Software Burbulas sprogsta pirmas, Nasdaq dar laikosi, is stipresnes medziagos nupintas tai dar gali karsto oro paimt ir daugiau

Prikabintos bylos

Cameco atrodo gerai, dugnas confirmintas. Kaip jis atrodo didesniuose intervaluose sunku sugaudyt, bet eina kazkur tarpe tarp energijos ir credit'o, kitaip tariant Naftos kainu kilimas yra ok, bet reikia zemesniu yieldu. Siuo metu labiau reaguoja i naftos kainas ir elgiasi kaip energijos asetas, korekcijos prilaikomos krentanciu yieldu ju metu. Krentanti nafta/kylantys yieldai butu peilis

Prikabintos bylos

Visos energijos akcijos kurias bepaimtum-nafta, uranium, anglis atrodo super ilguose intervaluose. I pensiju fondus jas reikia del long term laikymui.

Prikabintos bylos

Visos energijos akcijos kurias bepaimtum-nafta, uranium, anglis atrodo super ilguose intervaluose. I pensiju fondus jas reikia del long term laikymui, ypac po dipo ant menesiniu intervalu

Prikabintos bylos

Reikia tik atsirinkti tokias kurios turi daugiau exposure i Nafta ir angli. Tokios kaip WDS, jos vistiek nuims tuos buvusius topus, bet joms gali prireikti 10 metu kad tai padaryti, kas duotu tik 20% average metine graza(plius 10% dividendai).

Priezastis yra didele LNG exposure ir po keliu metu i rinka bus ismesta didelis supply of LNG is nauju projektu Katare, Afrikoj, US, Kanadoj, Mexico ir aisku WDS turi dideli projekta Australijoje kuris prades pumpuot at full scale 2027.

Tai numus LNG kainas ir profit margin bet kompanijos vistek isliks rekordiskai profitable, kas yra gerai akcijos kainai ir dividendams, bet blogai akcijos dinamikai ir letam augimui. Konkreciai WDS visi LNG kontraktai yra susieti ne su LNG, o su naftos kaina, tad cia pliusas, bet LNG ir naftos kainu gapui didejant tie kontraktai ko gero bus perziureti ateityje arba nepratesti o nauji jau neskaiciuos vertes nuo bareliu kainos.

Visa tai gerai atsispindi energijos akciju grafikuose kuriu strukturos yra panasios EW atzvilgiu, bet skirtingos augimo potencialo atzvilgiu.

Prikabintos bylos

Maisto kainos (Agriculture) eina i finaline banga. Reikia tiketis maisto kainu suolio parduotuvese, kurios darys dideli spaudima ir taip jau suspaustiems vartotojams.

Prikabintos bylos

Kiek cia liko tiems JUnk Bondams iki korekcijos pabaigos, kuriu free fall perlaus stubura AAA rated kreditu rinkoms. Sakyciau dar vienos nedideles bangos up ant weekly intervalu kad uzbaigt korekcijas nuo 2020. Kai apsisuks ir prades judet apacion galima bus ieskot topu ant stoku indeksu, arba jei nuo cia prades formuot lower highs.

Bank Loans (senior loans) jau sakyciau po vandeniu ir yra pirma kregzde. Geriausiai laikosi EM bondai, bet paskutinis dipas ant DOW sugeneravo siek tiek technical damage. Dar vienas dipas apacion ir trendas junkuose pasikeistu. is up i down.

Prikabintos bylos

⭐ How an ETF can “crash” an illiquid bond market
Here’s the chain reaction that can happen:

1. Investors sell the ETF heavily
ETFs trade like stocks — fast, continuous, deep liquidity.

2. ETF price falls below NAV
This is called a discount.
It signals that the ETF is pricing in stress that the underlying bonds haven’t yet reflected.

3. Authorized participants (APs) redeem ETF shares
To arbitrage the discount, APs redeem ETF units for the underlying bonds.

4. APs receive illiquid bonds they don’t want
They must sell them into a market with:

few buyers

wide bid–ask spreads

poor transparency

5. Forced selling pushes bond prices down sharply
This is where the “crash” can happen.

6. ETF NAV drops because the underlying bonds drop
This reinforces the cycle.

⭐ Has this happened before? Yes — multiple times
March 2020 (COVID crash)
High‑yield and corporate bond ETFs traded at record discounts

Underlying bonds froze

ETFs became the only source of price discovery

The Fed had to intervene with corporate bond purchases

This was the clearest example of ETFs transmitting stress into the bond market.

2015 high‑yield market freeze
Third Avenue Focused Credit Fund collapsed

HY ETFs saw huge discounts

Underlying bonds became untradeable

2013 “Taper Tantrum”
EM bond ETFs saw massive outflows

Underlying sovereign bonds crashed

⭐ So can ETFs cause a crash?
They can accelerate or expose a crash, but they don’t create the underlying fragility.

The real cause is:

**Underlying bonds are illiquid.
ETFs are liquid.
The mismatch is the risk.**

ETFs act like a pressure valve — they reveal stress early and transmit it quickly.

⭐ Which bond ETFs are most at risk?
The ones with the biggest liquidity mismatch:

🥇 Bank loan ETFs (e.g., BKLN)
Loans settle in T+7 to T+20.
ETF trades in milliseconds.

🥈 High‑yield bond ETFs (HYG, JNK)
Underlying bonds often trade once every few days.

🥉 Emerging market bond ETFs (EMB, EMLC)
Capital controls + thin markets = fragile.

🏅 Municipal bond ETFs (MUB)
Tens of thousands of tiny issuers, very illiquid.

⭐ Clean takeaway
Yes — an illiquid bond market can crash or freeze if its ETFs face heavy selling.
But the ETF is not the cause — it’s the messenger that reveals the underlying illiquidity.

✔ ETFs are liquid
✔ Bonds are not
✔ In a panic, the ETF price collapses first
✔ Forced redemptions push illiquid bonds into a thin market
✔ That can trigger or accelerate a crash
This is one of the biggest structural risks in modern credit markets.

⭐ Could an illiquid bond market + ETF selling trigger a 2008‑style crisis?
Not in the same way as 2008 — but it can trigger a major credit crunch, liquidity freeze, and forced‑selling spiral that feels similar in markets.

The mechanism is different, but the outcome (credit markets seizing up) can rhyme with 2008.

Let’s break it down cleanly.

⭐ 1. 2008 was about solvency, not liquidity
2008 happened because:

Banks held toxic mortgage assets

Those assets were mis‑rated

Counterparties didn’t trust each other

The banking system itself was at risk

That was a solvency crisis.

Bond ETF stress is not a solvency crisis.
It’s a liquidity mismatch crisis.

Different disease, similar symptoms.

⭐ 2. Bond ETFs can trigger a liquidity crisis — not a banking collapse
Here’s what can happen:

✔ Investors dump bond ETFs (HYG, JNK, EMB, BKLN)
✔ ETF prices fall faster than the underlying
✔ Authorized participants redeem ETF shares
✔ They receive illiquid bonds
✔ They try to sell those bonds
✔ The underlying market freezes
✔ Credit spreads blow out
✔ Companies can’t refinance
✔ Defaults rise
This is a credit crunch, not a banking collapse.

It’s painful, but it’s not 2008.

⭐ 3. The closest real‑world example: March 2020
In March 2020:

Corporate bond ETFs traded at huge discounts

Underlying bonds stopped trading

The ETF became the only price discovery

The Fed had to step in and buy corporate bonds

This was the closest we’ve come to a systemic bond‑ETF‑driven crisis.

It wasn’t 2008, but it was serious.

⭐ 4. Could it escalate into something bigger?
Here’s the honest assessment:

✔ Yes — a massive selloff in illiquid bond ETFs can freeze credit markets.
✔ Yes — that can trigger recessionary pressure.
✔ Yes — it can cause defaults and funding stress.
✔ No — it won’t collapse the global banking system like 2008.
Why not?

Banks are better capitalized

There’s no hidden leverage like CDO‑squared

ETFs are transparent

Regulators understand the mismatch

Central banks now intervene faster

The system is fragile — but not in the same way.

⭐ 5. The real risk is this:
A credit market freeze caused by ETF‑driven forced selling can:

spike yields

crush corporate refinancing

trigger waves of defaults

cause a sharp recession

hit equities hard

blow up high‑yield markets

This is a market crash, not a financial system collapse.

Think 2015 + 2020, not 2008.

⭐ Clean takeaway
Bond ETFs can absolutely trigger a major liquidity crisis.
They cannot trigger a 2008‑style systemic banking collapse.
But they can cause a violent credit crunch and market crash.

Ka reikia stebti, kokie butu pirmi pavojaus zenklai

⭐ Historical pattern: When does HYG fall enough to force underlying liquidation?
Across every major stress event (2013, 2015, 2020), the same thresholds show up:

⭐ Threshold 1 — A 2–3% drop in a single day
This is the point where:

ETF price moves faster than NAV

NAV becomes stale

Discounts open

Authorized Participants (APs) begin to consider redemptions

This does NOT force liquidation yet, but it’s the first warning sign.

Historical examples
2015 HY freeze: HYG fell ~2.5% intraday

2013 taper tantrum: HYG fell ~2% in a day

This is the “stress begins” zone.

⭐ Threshold 2 — A 4–6% drop over 2–3 days
This is where forced underlying selling begins.

Why?

Because:

APs redeem ETF shares

They receive illiquid HY bonds

They must sell those bonds into a thin market

Dealers widen spreads

NAV collapses to catch up

This is the liquidity‑mismatch trigger zone.

Historical examples
March 2020: HYG fell ~5% in 48 hours

NAV lagged by ~3–4%

APs redeemed aggressively

Underlying HY bonds gapped down

Fed intervened days later

This is the point where the ETF forces price discovery into the underlying market.

⭐ Threshold 3 — A 7–10% drop in under a week
This is the “deep discount” crisis zone where:

ETF trades at a 4–6% discount to NAV

NAV becomes meaningless

Underlying bonds freeze

Dealers refuse to make markets

Forced selling cascades

Credit spreads explode

This is the closest the system gets to a credit‑market crash.

Historical example
March 2020 (COVID crash)

HYG dropped ~10% in 7 days

Discounts hit ~5–6%

Underlying HY bonds became untradeable

Fed launched corporate bond buying program

This is the only time in history the Fed has ever bought corporate bonds — because the ETF‑driven forced selling was breaking the market.

⭐ So what’s the real answer?
Here’s the clean, practical rule:

⭐ A 4–6% drop in HYG over 2–3 days is historically enough to force underlying liquidation.
This is the point where:

APs redeem

Underlying HY bonds get dumped

NAV collapses

Discounts widen

Liquidity evaporates

And if the move continues:

⭐ A 7–10% drop in under a week = deep discount + systemic stress.
This is the “March 2020 zone.”

⭐ Why these thresholds matter
High‑yield bonds are:

OTC

illiquid

slow to trade

dependent on dealer balance sheets

priced by models, not trades

HYG is:

extremely liquid

trades every second

used by institutions for hedging

the real price discovery mechanism

So when HYG moves fast, the underlying market is forced to follow — even if it doesn’t want to.

⭐ Clean takeaway
✔ 2–3% daily drop = early stress
✔ 4–6% drop in 2–3 days = forced underlying liquidation begins
✔ 7–10% drop in under a week = deep discount, market freeze, Fed‑level event
This is exactly what history shows.

Rimtas, dabar konkrečiai statai 2026 m. už meškas?

Jei nafta brangi liks ir toliau, tai statyčiau ir aš už meškas. Principe laukiu, kol kas nepasiseks derybose su Iranu ir viskas važiuos žemyn.

Jei nafta brangi liks ir toliau, tai statyčiau ir aš už meškas. Principe laukiu, kol kas nepasiseks derybose su Iranu ir viskas važiuos žemyn.
Jei dar šiandien penktadienį nekils, o leisis -reiškia meškų rinka.

Kaip sekasi laukimas? Nebijai užtrukt?

nu ką meškos, per kelias dienas papylė dolerių ir eurų. Išprotėję rinkos. Vėl pasiteisino pristatymas put pristatymas prie prastų nuotaikų. Kainos kyla, kainos krenta o pinigai lieka.

Nebijau, po mėnesio paklausk

Aš nežinau kaip Jus matote, prekiaujate, bet aš matau UP iki Rugpjūčio pabaigos bent jau.

Visaip gali būti. Bet karas dar nesibaigė.
Niekada nereikia šokti į nuvažiavusį traukinį. Korekcija būna visada.
Šiaip nesu investuotojas, aš spekuliantas. Tai man tik svyravymai idomu

P.. visiems tas karas. Nelabai jau rimtai rinkos atsižvelgia į Ryžo cirkus

Dabar euforija, rytoj pirmadienį gal prablaivėjimas bus.
Rinkos toks dalykas, kad kai kažkas perka, kažkas parduoda. Market makeriai negali dirbti į minusą visada. Todėl korekcijos būna visada.