Ateina tikrai blogi laikai, bet negali jie vien kristi, reikia ir išmaudyti žmones. Todėl svyravimai bus dideli.

Tai trendai visada tokia pacia dinamika turi, nesvarbu up ar down. Krenta bangom, Tik bear market raliai buna labiau ispudingi, nes zmones galvoja kad va sitas dipas jau buvo paskutinis ir skuba uzsipirkt, galvodami kad bus kaip Post Covid.

Tai taip, kažkur ir bandysiu sudalyvauti 1-2 dienoms. Dabar Bear market jau. Ryškus.

Susumavus

⭐ The sequence matters more than the final direction
Here’s the realistic path markets tend to follow in a Hormuz‑type shock:

Phase 1 — Shock (now)
oil up

yields up or stuck high

equities down

volatility up

shipping chaos

Phase 2 — Strain
credit cracks

liquidity tightens

global PMIs fall

consumer demand weakens

Phase 3 — Break
equities fall sharply

long yields collapse

oil peaks and rolls over

recession pricing begins

Phase 4 — Stabilization
long bonds rally

USD strong

commodities normalize

equities bottom later

This is the same pattern seen in every major supply‑driven oil shock.

⭐ Clean takeaway
The Hormuz crisis is bearish for risk assets in the short and medium term,
but bullish for long‑duration Treasuries once the recessionary phase begins.

So the outcome is not “bearish no matter what” — it’s:

🟥 Bearish for equities
🟧 Bullish for oil (temporarily)
🟩 Bullish for long bonds (later)

Mano nuomone mes kazkur arti Phase 2 bet dar i ja neiejom.

Jei gerai supratau kaip veikia bondu rinkos ir kokia koreliacija buvo istoriskai tai viskas juda mazdaug taip-pradzioj yieldu kilimo -infliacinis spaudimas, nafta kyla, stokai kyla.
Antra faze-Yieldai kyla toliau, stokams to jau per daug,pradeda buksuot/ naftai vis dar gerai

Trecia faze-auksti yieldai-stokai pradeda krashint, nafta eina link topu.

Veliau flight into Treasuries, Stokus dumpina, yieldus dumpina, nafta dumpina

Rinse and repeat didesniam intervale:
viskas botomina mazdaug kartu, nafta vel kyla, visi galvoja infliacija, nafta pradeda acceleruotis, yieldai soka up, stokai issigasta ir neria apacion prisimine kas buvo praeita karta, new highs nepasiekia. Comodai ir yieldai bull, stokai bear.

Kas supranta geriau gal pataisys.
:

Prikabintos bylos

Pafantazuojam dar USD/DOW/GOLD

Prikabintos bylos

Palyginam NIKKEI Bubble su NASDAQ Bubble ir koks likimas laukia anksciau ar veliau.

Prikabintos bylos

ThePope, ka turi omenyje situ sakiniu ir AI: "tie kurie pildosi portfelius dabar su 30 metų tikslais gali tapti labai nusivylę rezultatais." Jei tiesa, kad AI ir robotika pakels produktyvuma i neregetas aukstumas ar ne logiska tiketis, kad investave i S&P500 indeksa taip pat turetu gaut didziule graza ir neturetu but nusivyle? Turint omenyje, kad imones, gave daugiausiai naudos is AI greiciausiai irgi bus S&P500 indekse.

Tie kurie investuos i AI su 30 metu tikslais, irgi gali tapt labai nusivyle, nes AI ribotos galimybes gali paaisket gan greitai.

Apskritai tai dabar yra .com stadijoje, kur neaisku kokie projektai isvis liks gyvi.

Turiu omenyje paprastą dalyką, kas dabar perka su tokiais tikslais prie dabartinių akcijų įverčių tikisi kad robotika ir AI padarys tokį milžinišką proveržį produktyvume, kad to pasekoje tiek stipriai išaugs verslų pelnai, kad pateisins šiuos įverčius. Jei taip neįvyks, daugiamete jav akcijų grąža bus gerokai žemesnė nei istorinė. Buitiniu pavyzdžiu, akumuliuodamas indeksus tikiesi 9% on avg, o sumoje gausi tik pvz. 4%.

Kaip naftos kaina veikia minerius. Panasu kad jiems priimtina kaina prie kurios jie gali sekmingai operuoti yra apie $70/b. Viskas kas yra auksciau jiems nera gerai. Kolkas matosi negatyvi koreliacija, kas yra defliacinis trendas. Jeigu kazkokiu tai budu ta $70 kaina bus perskaiciuota auksciau, pozityvi koreliacija turetu sugryzti atgal. Investuojant i resources pozityvi koreliacija yra butina. Ji indikuoja augima kartu su infliacija.

Kitu atveju visa resource industrija bus tiesiog naftos kainos ikaitais kol ji nenusistoves kazkokiam tai lygyje kur jis bebutu.

Grafikas Vario mineriu, bet bet kokie mineriai panasiai atrodo dabar-jie visi ziuri i naftos kaina, o ne i augimo prospektus.


Kitas dalykas ka galima paimt is to grafiko yra tas kad naftai einant i new highs, mineriai neina i new lows. Kas yra gerai ir rodo kad vyksta operaciju perskaiciavimas itraukiant nauja energijos kainos kintamaja. Kai tik mineriai pajudes ta pacia kryptim kaip nafta, tai mano galva iskart bus BUY signalas, kad viskas ten jau apskaiciuota, pasverta, ir gali vel eiti pirmyn su didenesm naftos kainom. Kolkas 5 bangu nuo dugno nera.

Prikabintos bylos

Viena idomu grafika man pasiule, atseit ka eliotas leidzia. Tai techniskai taip, eliotas leidzia toki scenariju.

Prikabintos bylos

Bet elioto bangas formuoja zmones ir ju sprendimai ir ziurim kokia buvo situacija tuomet ir dabar ir ar imanomas toks pats scenarijus realybeje. Uzdaviau AI uzduoti isanalizuot siuos du laikotarpius.

Prikabintos bylos

Isvada tokia kad gali taip atsitikt, bet pobudis skirtusi kardinaliai nuo Japonijos Bubble ir greiciausiai butu ispustos tik US mega capsai MAG7 ir pan, bet tam reiktu agresyviu rate cuts is Fedo puses ir zemu naftos kainu. Kitaip tariant Gali, bet situacija ant zemes sako kad to nebus.

1. CPI and inflation backdrop
Japan 1983–1985:

CPI was low and stable, roughly 1–3%, sometimes less.

Policymakers felt comfortable keeping money easy because there was no visible consumer inflation.

The “problem” was invisible: asset inflation, not CPI.

Today:

We’ve just come out of the highest global inflation since the 1970s.

Central banks are still scarred—there’s much less tolerance for “letting it run”.

Inflation is falling, but not back to the ultra‑low 2010s regime everywhere.

Implication:
Japan’s bubble grew in a world where inflation looked boring and safe. Today’s policymakers are much more inflation‑sensitive and quicker to tighten.

2. Interest rates and bond yields
Japan 1983–1985:

BOJ policy rate around 5%, then cut aggressively toward 2.5%.

Real rates fell sharply as nominal rates dropped into a low‑inflation environment.

Globally, long‑term yields (e.g., U.S. 10Y) were still high—disinflation from very high levels.

Today:

We’ve just had the fastest global hiking cycle in decades.

Policy rates are high but starting to edge down.

10Y yields are moderate, not extreme—real yields are positive but not punishing.

Implication:
Japan’s bubble was fueled by a big, sudden easing into a low‑inflation world. Today we’re in a mild easing after a big tightening into a still‑sensitive inflation world. The fuel is weaker.

3. Oil prices and energy conditions
Japan 1983–1985:

Oil had collapsed from the 70s shocks.

Energy became cheap and abundant relative to the prior decade.

That supported growth and freed up capital for speculation.

Today:

Oil is high and volatile, with recurring spikes from geopolitics.

Energy is available, but the system is fragile: OPEC+, shale, chokepoints, climate policy.

Energy is a tax on growth, not a tailwind.

Implication:
Japan’s bubble rode on cheap energy and benign supply. Today’s world is more constrained and volatile—less friendly to a long, smooth asset mania.

4. Credit, banking, and leverage
Japan 1983–1990:

Banks were loosely regulated, politically connected, and aggressive.

Land was used as collateral; rising prices justified more lending; classic reflexive loop.

Corporate and real estate leverage exploded.

Today:

Post‑GFC regulation is tighter (Basel, stress tests, capital rules).

Shadow finance exists, but banks are less free to go full‑Japan.

Leverage has migrated to governments, private equity, and some households, not just banks.

Implication:
We can still get bubbles, but the channel is different. Less “bank‑driven land mania”, more “financial‑asset and private‑market froth”.

5. Oil availability and systemic risk
Japan era:

No major structural shortage.

Non‑OPEC supply rising, demand growth strong, but no chronic constraint.

Energy was not the bottleneck—credit and speculation were.

Today:

Physical supply is adequate, but:

chokepoints (Hormuz, Red Sea)

OPEC+ policy

shale discipline

climate constraints

Energy can trigger recessions or inflation spikes more easily.

Implication:
Today’s system is more prone to energy‑driven shocks that interrupt bubbles rather than quietly fuel them.

So… can a Japan‑style 1983–1990 scenario repeat?
If by “same scenario” you mean:
low CPI

aggressive rate cuts

cheap energy

massive bank‑driven credit boom

equity + property bubble

then a brutal rate‑hike bust

Then my honest conclusion is:

Exact replay? No.

Rhymes? Yes, in pockets.

Why not an exact replay?
Policymakers are much more inflation‑sensitive now.

Banking systems are more regulated.

Energy is more volatile and politicised.

Demographics and debt loads are very different.

The world is already highly financialised—Japan was entering that phase; we’re deep in it.

Where could it rhyme?
U.S. mega‑cap tech + AI + private markets could be today’s “Nikkei + Tokyo land”.

Ultra‑low or falling real rates could again justify silly valuations.

Local housing markets (e.g., some Anglosphere cities) can still behave very “Japan‑like”.

A central bank that eases too far, too fast into a low‑inflation lull could accidentally re‑inflate an asset bubble.

Clean conclusion
You’re basically asking: are we setting up for another “low CPI, cheap money, huge asset bubble, then lost decade” like Japan?

My distilled answer:

Macro backdrop is different: higher recent inflation, more cautious central banks, more fragile energy.

Financial system is different: more regulated banks, more leverage in markets and governments.

So the form of the bubble will differ.

But the mechanism—cheap money + complacency about CPI + underestimation of asset inflation—absolutely can happen again, just likely:

more in global financial assets than in one country’s land market, and

more stop‑start because energy and geopolitics keep jolting the system.

Taip pat isanalizuojam kaip dabartinis NASDAQ Bubble rimuojasi su tuometiniu Jponijos Bubble


today’s Nasdaq has several traits that rhyme with Japan’s 1983–1990 bubble, but not all of them, and the differences matter just as much as the similarities.

Let’s break this down cleanly so you can see where the parallels are real, where they’re superficial, and what that means for risk.

⭐ 1. The big similarities
These are the traits where the Nasdaq today strongly resembles Japan’s bubble era.

1. Asset prices rising much faster than the real economy
Japan 1983–1990:

Land prices up 200–300%

Nikkei up ~300%

Corporate valuations detached from earnings

Nasdaq today:

Mega‑cap tech valuations expanded far faster than GDP

AI‑linked stocks priced for perfection

Market cap concentration at historic highs

This is the closest parallel.

2. Low inflation masking asset inflation
Japan:

CPI ~1–2%

Policymakers saw no danger

Asset inflation exploded under the surface

Today:

CPI has cooled from the 2021–2022 spike

Policymakers are easing again

Asset inflation (tech, AI, private markets) is running hot

This is another strong rhyme.

3. Credit conditions easing after a tightening cycle
Japan:

BOJ cut rates aggressively after the 1985 Plaza Accord

Cheap money poured into speculation

Today:

Central banks are cutting after the fastest tightening in decades

Liquidity is returning

Tech and private markets are absorbing the flow

Cheap money + low CPI + optimism = bubble fuel.

4. Narrative‑driven optimism
Japan:

“Japan Inc. will dominate the world”

“Land prices never fall”

“The Nikkei will hit 100,000”

Nasdaq today:

“AI will transform everything”

“Tech margins are permanent”

“The Magnificent 7 are untouchable”

Narratives don’t cause bubbles — but they sustain them.

⭐ 2. The key differences
These are the reasons why the Nasdaq today is not a carbon copy of Japan 1983–1990.

1. Japan’s bubble was credit‑driven; Nasdaq’s is equity‑driven
Japan:

Banks lent aggressively

Land used as collateral

Leverage exploded

Today:

Banks are heavily regulated

Leverage is lower in households

The bubble is in equities, not real estate credit

Equity bubbles burst differently — usually faster, with less systemic damage.

2. Japan’s demographics were peaking; the U.S. is not
Japan 1980s:

Population growth slowing

Workforce aging

Productivity stagnating

U.S. today:

Population still growing

Immigration high

Tech productivity rising

Demographics shape long‑term valuation ceilings.

3. Japan’s monetary policy mistake was extreme
Japan:

BOJ kept rates at 2.5% for too long

Then hiked to 6% in a year

Bubble burst violently

Today:

Central banks are more cautious

They react faster to inflation

They avoid sudden, massive hikes

The policy error risk is lower — not zero, but lower.

4. Oil and energy conditions are different
Japan 1980s:

Oil was cheap and abundant

Energy was a tailwind

Today:

Oil is volatile

Geopolitics can shock supply

Energy is a constraint, not a tailwind

Energy shocks can interrupt bubbles.

⭐ 3. So… could the Nasdaq experience a Japan‑style bubble and crash?
A full Japan‑style collapse (‑80% and 30 years of stagnation)?
→ Unlikely.
Japan’s collapse was driven by a credit‑real‑estate implosion.
The Nasdaq is not built on bank leverage.

A major correction (‑30% to ‑50%) if rates rise or earnings disappoint?
→ Absolutely possible.
Equity bubbles burst quickly when expectations break.

A long stagnation period like Japan’s “lost decades”?
→ Possible only if:

productivity disappoints

AI earnings fail to materialize

rates stay structurally higher

geopolitical shocks hit tech supply chains

But the U.S. economy is more dynamic than Japan’s was.

⭐ Clean conclusion
Here’s the honest, balanced answer:

✔ The Nasdaq today does share several key traits with Japan’s 1983–1990 bubble:
low CPI masking asset inflation

liquidity returning

narrative‑driven optimism

valuations stretched

concentration risk

✔ But the structural differences are huge:
no credit‑real‑estate leverage loop

more dynamic demographics

more flexible monetary policy

different energy backdrop

✔ So the Nasdaq can absolutely experience a sharp bubble‑style correction,
but a Japan‑style multi‑decade stagnation is far less likely.

Buvau trumpam isejes is energy tai siandien vel uzeinu ant WDS. Pigiau atpirkt nepavyko nei pardaviau, bet gal pavyks didesne poza sulipdyt jei zemiau eis, ka ir dariau anksciau ir labai gerai pasiteisino, tik kantrybes reikia.

Tikuosi dar vieno popso aukstyn kai nafta eis su finaline banga up, tik neaisku nuo kur ir kada, bet tas reiksmes neturi kai yra laiko ir resursu. Veliau neisiu i atskiras akcijas ir long term trenda josiu ant ETF tad cia paskutini karta zaidziu su WDS, kuri gerai apsere divais kol laukiau to kas ir turejo atsitikt.

Buciu linkes labiau i XOM eit, bet ASX nelsitinguota tad tiesiog ziuresiu ETF kur jis turi dideli svori. XOM faktiskai yra No1 pagal kokybe ir kur jis stovi rinkoj-pilnai interguotas gigantas kuris gerai virina net recesijoj nes turi savo refineries ir pan. WDS yra LNG ir geros ateities neturi del besipleciancios LNG rinkos. Bet medium term dideles bangos naftoj visus nuo dugnu pakelia ka beturetum.

Prikabintos bylos

Taip pat taikausi i Angli, siek tiek praziopsojau dipa kol kitkuo buvo demesys uzimtas, bet gal dar sugrys.

Anksciau i angli ziurejau pet zvakinius grafikus ir itariau sita scenariju, tiesiog buvo tikra betvarke ten zvakese . Bet senas geras eliotas isryskina viska ka itariau, iskelia i dienos sviesa.

Prikabintos bylos

Bet ta pacia uzduoti duok Grok, Gemini, perplexity, chatgpt.. visi duos savo skirtingus atsakymus

Sakykim taip-jie suranda info, ja apibendrina, bet isvadas pasidarai pats pagal dabartine situacija. Informacija kuria jie visi remiasi greiciausiai bus paimta is tu paciu saltiniu. Tad sioj vietoj svarbiausia yra faktai , o ju interpretacija skirsis ne tik tarp ivairiu AI, bet ir tarp skirtingu zmoniu. Tokia jau ta ekonomika, gali ja interpretuot kaip nori.

Bet vienas dalykas lieka svarbus-aukstos energijos kainos dar ne vieno burbulo nepadejo toliau pust. Tiesa sakant visada buvo atvirksciai.