Palūkanos už indėlius brangsta. O tai yra gerai.

Tai kad vistek nieks jo neklauso, tik dievina kiap staba. Jei klausytu tai girdetu ka jis sako-nera geru valuation siuo metu.

Gerai tik indelininkams, o tiems kurie tas palukanas turi uzdirbt nelabai gera zinia. Didesne dauguma zmoniu nera indelininkai, ju yra mazuma. Pasaulis daugiau stovi ant tu zmoniu peciu, kurie tas palukanas turi uzdirbt 240 Trilijonu dydzio pasaulinei kreditu rinkai. Skolos rinka yra dvigubai didesne nei akciju rinka su 120TRL. Palukanos up-dirbk daugiau ir nasiau kad pasivyt, namo parnesi maziau, darbo valandos ilgesnes. Grubiai issireiskus.

Taip, bet o ką padarysi, jei infrastruktūra paseno, pramonė keliasi į Aziją. Jei ekonomika auga, kišk kur nori pinigus, visur uždirbsi. Jei ekonomika krenta, tai neuždirbsi niekur. Pinigų spausdinimas ir infliacija nepadės niekaip, jei reali pramonė neauga.

Kaip viskas istoriskai budavo panasioj situacijoj kaip dabartine


⭐ So what is the MOST LIKELY scenario from here?
Based on historical patterns and the mechanics of supply, demand, and refinancing:

⭐ Most likely path:
1. Long yields stay elevated (4–5%) into the maturity wall
Supply pressure + inflation uncertainty keep yields from falling early.

2. Financial conditions tighten → markets wobble
Equities weaken, credit spreads widen, liquidity thins.

3. A risk‑off event triggers a sharp drop in long yields
This is the flight‑to‑safety phase.

4. The long end collapses BEFORE the short end
This is the recession signal.

5. The 2‑year yield collapses LAST
This marks the end of the bear phase.

This sequence has repeated for 40+ years.

⭐ Why this scenario is more likely than yields staying high all year
Because:

refinancing needs are huge

deficits are large

the economy is interest‑rate sensitive

high yields eventually break something

markets always move from inflation fear → recession fear

The bond market rarely stays in the “high long yields” regime for long when refinancing pressure is heavy.

⭐ Clean takeaway
With long yields at 4–5% and a large maturity wall this year, the most likely scenario is:

✔ Yields stay high or drift higher short‑term
✔ Financial stress builds
✔ A risk‑off event triggers a sharp drop in long yields
✔ The long end falls first (10Y/20Y/30Y)
✔ The short end falls last (2Y)
✔ That marks the end of the cycle
This is the classic transition from the inflationary phase to the deflationary phase.

⭐ Step 1 — How many tankers are waiting?
From the latest maritime intelligence:

≈ 230 crude tankers
…are waiting near or inside the Strait of Hormuz.

(This excludes LNG/LPG and product tankers.)

⭐ Step 2 — What is the typical tanker size?
The mix around Hormuz is usually:

VLCCs (~2,000,000 barrels)

Suezmax (~1,000,000 barrels)

Aframax (~700,000 barrels)

The Gulf exports overwhelmingly use VLCCs, so the average is skewed upward.

A realistic weighted average is:

≈ 1.5 million barrels per tanker
⭐ Step 3 — Multiply
230 tankers × 1.5 million barrels ≈ 345 million barrels

So the amount of crude effectively “stuck” is:

⭐ ≈ 300–350 million barrels of oil
This is a massive amount — roughly:

3–4 days of global oil demand, or

~10 days of China’s imports, or

~2 weeks of U.S. imports

Tai realisiskai jei Hormuza atidarytu, pasaulis turetu 3-4 dienas naftos is viso to back logo kuris ten dabar sedi ,

Bet nieks neuzduoda svarbiausio klausimo- kiek reikia laiko kad tas crude pasiektu masinos baka

⛴️ 1. Voyage time from Gulf to refiner
Depends on destination:

Gulf → Europe:
~20–25 days (via Suez, if open)

Gulf → Mediterranean:
~15–20 days

Gulf → India:
~5–10 days

Gulf → China / North Asia:
~20–30 days

Gulf → US Gulf Coast (via Cape):
~40–50 days if rerouted around Africa

Call it ~1–4 weeks of sailing in normal conditions, longer if rerouting.

🏭 2. Storage + refinery scheduling
Once crude arrives:

Waiting in port / storage / line‑up:
~2–7 days (can be more in congestion)

Refinery run (from crude input to finished products):
The crude enters a continuous process, but from this batch entering to finished products leaving:
~1–3 days is a reasonable operational window.

So from arrival to finished product leaving refinery:
~3–10 days in normal conditions.

🚚 3. Distribution to end consumer
From refinery to you:

Pipeline / barge / rail / truck to depots:
~2–7 days

From depots to retail (stations, industry, etc.):
~1–3 days

So from refinery gate to consumer:
~3–10 days again.

🧮 Put it all together
From crude on a tanker near Hormuz to final product in consumer hands:

Voyage: ~1–4 weeks

Refinery + storage: ~1–2 weeks

Distribution: ~1–2 weeks

So realistically:

~4–8 weeks from “crude on ship” → “fuel in car / product in use”
In stressed conditions (rerouting, congestion, outages):
~8–12+ weeks is very possible.

Clean takeaway
In a smooth world: about 1–2 months from stuck crude to end consumer.

In a disrupted world (Hormuz issues, rerouting, refinery bottlenecks):
think 2–3 months+ lag before the full impact shows up at the pump or in product prices.

Per ta laika kol visa ta nafta pasieks consumeri, salys tures istustinti savo rezervus,, didesne dauguma mazu valstybiu neturi dideliu rezervu ir jos priklauso grynai nuo importo. Didziausios salys su rezervais yra sios

⭐ Clean Summary — Who Has the Most Protection?
Strongest (longest survival):
Japan (~230 days)

South Korea (~150–180 days)

EU (~100–120 days)

Moderate:
United States (~350M barrels left)

China (~40–60 days est.)

Weakest / most exposed:
India (~10 days)

UK (~30–40 days)

USA isgauna daugiau nei sunaudoja. Tai kodel tokios nesamones Tamstos statistikoje?

Pastebekit kad Indija turi tik 10 gienu rezervu ir net ir atidarius Hormuz rytoj, ji neisgyvens iki kol jis atvyks pas ja. Ziurekit kaip Indijos Indeksas collapsins nepaisant Hormuz situacijos outcome. Yra ir daugiau tokiu kurios turi mazus rezervus. Lietuva patenka i 90 dienu mandatory reserves bloka, bet tos 90 dienu jau skaiciuojasi nuo tada kai sustojo importas, ne nuo siandien.

Australija turi vos 2 savaites rezervu, kiti jos rezervai yra laikomi US teritorijoje ir negali buti greitai pasiekti krizes metu

Plius visa tai turi buti perdirbta-tam irgi reikia laiko. Naujoji zelandija jau faktiskai baigia viska ir tuoj stos.


Zodziu kas ten bebutu su tuo Hormuz ir ka Trumpas dabar bedarytu praktiskai didesne dauguma pasaulio jau yra fucked.

Tu Ai paklausk, tau AI atsakys...


⭐ 1. The U.S. produces a lot of oil — but not the right kind for its refineries
Most U.S. production is:

light, sweet crude (shale oil)

But many U.S. refineries were built decades ago to process:

heavy, sour crude (the type imported from the Middle East, Canada, Venezuela)

So even though the U.S. produces a huge amount of oil, it still imports millions of barrels per day of heavy crude to match refinery configurations.

This means:

High U.S. production ≠ low import needs
High U.S. production ≠ full SPR

⭐ 2. The SPR was drawn down heavily in recent years
The U.S. SPR used to hold:

~700 million barrels

After multiple emergency releases, it now holds:

~350–370 million barrels

That’s roughly half of historical levels.

Why it wasn’t refilled quickly:

refilling requires budget

refilling raises oil prices

refilling competes with commercial buyers

refilling takes time (cavern maintenance, injection rates)

So even though the U.S. pumps a lot, the SPR doesn’t automatically refill itself.

⭐ 3. U.S. production is mostly from shale — which declines fast
Shale wells:

decline 50–70% in the first year

require constant drilling to maintain output

are sensitive to price swings

So even though the U.S. is a major producer, the production base is:

high‑volume

high‑decline

capital‑intensive

This makes it harder to “pump more” on demand.

⭐ 4. SPR is not meant to be full all the time
The SPR is designed for:

emergencies

supply shocks

wartime disruptions

hurricanes

refinery outages

It is not designed to be kept at maximum capacity constantly.

The U.S. relies more on:

commercial inventories

domestic production

diversified import sources

large refining capacity

So the SPR is just one part of a much bigger system.

⭐ 5. The U.S. exports a lot of oil — but imports a lot too
This is the part most people miss.

The U.S. simultaneously:

exports ~4–5 million barrels/day (light crude + refined products)

imports ~6–7 million barrels/day (heavy crude)

This is because:

U.S. refineries prefer heavy crude

foreign refineries prefer U.S. light crude

So the U.S. is a net exporter, but still deeply integrated into global flows.

⭐ 6. So why doesn’t the U.S. just pump more to refill the SPR?
Because:

shale output can’t be ramped instantly

producers respond to price, not government needs

refilling the SPR competes with commercial demand

refilling raises domestic fuel prices

storage caverns have limited injection rates

the government doesn’t control private production

The U.S. government cannot order oil companies to increase production.

⭐ Clean takeaway
Even though the U.S. is a major oil producer:

✔ It produces mostly light crude
✔ It still needs heavy crude imports
✔ The SPR was drawn down and takes time to refill
✔ Shale production declines fast and can’t surge instantly
✔ The U.S. exports a lot of oil even while importing
✔ The government doesn’t control production
So being a top producer does not automatically mean having a full SPR.

Nekartok nesąmonių. Jau daug kartų rašyta, kad skalūnų nafta skiriasi nuo normalios naftos ir iš jos neišeis nei dyzelis, nei mazutas, tik benzinas. Skalūnų nafta yra SUPER lengva, tai naftos kondensatas.
Tai nelygink B su pirštu, nors abejais gali pabadyti ką nors.
Jei JAV būtų super gerai su nafta, tai nesvaigtų JAV nei apie Venesuelą, Grenlandiją, Kanadą, Iraną ir t.t.
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Pasirodo rimtas tau ir DI išvadą pateikė jau
Tai gali klausyti DI, manęs, arba prievartauk DI ir toliau

Tai tiesiog genialus Trumpo planas. Pats kariauti tingi, tai tegul kariaują už jį tie, kuriems trūksta naftos ir dujų.
Net žaviuosi Trumpo genialumu ir mokėjimu prišikti ir priversti kitus tą ššš valyti

Krosnis, tokie klausimai tik parodo zmoniu situacijos nesuvokima ir kad jie tieisog investuoja/galvoja pagal CNN naratives. Atseit US yra didzisuia exporter ir gamintoja tai jai nieks negresia.

Arba kad kai tik atidarys Hormus iskart rytoj begsim i koloneles ir pilsim pilnus bakus papigiai ir ekonomika vel uzbujos.

Realiai sis karas ne tik padidino US biudzeto deficita ir skolas, bet ir istustino daugumos saliu naftos rezervus, kurie net ir greitai atidarius Hormuz negales but papildyti nes pirmenybe bus teikiama uzpildyti vartojimo spragas. Tai palieka labai nedidele margin naftos rinkoj kad bent koks sekantis net mazas disruption iskart butu katastrofinis.

Mano isvada butu tokia-jei per sekancias 2-3savaites Hormuz nebus atidarytas ir trafick'as judes laisvai ir greitai be jokiu suvarzymu-eisim i Great Depression 2.0 scenariju .

Jei atidarys sia savaite-eisim tik i Recesija, bet su laiku turetumem issikapstyt.

Abu scenarijai nera geri stocku indeksams ir greiciausiai ne vienas is ju nauju topu jau nepasieks, arba finalizuos strukturas su paskutinem bangom. O apie OIL $50 greitai galima isvis pamirst ir jo tokia kaina bus tik kai bear marketas eis i pabaiga(net zemiau, gal ir visi $10)

Daug žmonių humintarai, idėjiniai ir propagandos pilni, ką padarysi. Kartais tingiu ką nors jiems aiškinti, kartais užeina noras

Dar 15 min palauksiu, gal kokį EUR pašortinsiu, bet norėčiau dar SP500 pašortinti, bet nežinau ar sulauksiu atidarymo.
Rytą arba dieną, reikės žiūrėti kokių metalų nupirkti.
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Chebra gerai pastebėjo, Trumpas savaitgaliais piktas, nes biržos nedirba, o biržų dienomis geras ir taikus.
Tai rytoj arba poryt reikės ką medžioti jei -10 proc pavarys rinkos

Visos valiutos atsidarė su Gapu prieš USD. Indeksų kritimas irgi bus geras.

Metalai yra inflationary assetas, reikia su jais siuo metu buti itin atsargiems. Jie eis i virsu tik jei US long End'as (10-30Y) lips ausktyn. Bet bondu rinkos zino kad bet koks Long Endu dipas signalizuoja deflationary turn ir iskart sellina comodus ant jo. Bei vel perka kai tik new highs padaro tarkim ant 1H intervalu.

Tai tik rodo marketu nervu stadija, kai visi ant ribos pasiruose dumpint viska jei tik Long endas pradetu siuozt apacion ir suformuotu Lower high ant didesniu intervalu.

Nes yra didele infliacija, kuri vos tik spragtejus pirstais persiverstu i defliacija.

Tas taip, svyravimai bus dideli , bet tikiuosi sidabrą pamatyti apie 61 usd, ir auksą apie 4200, tada jau galima bandyti .
Kaip ir stiprūs pasipriešinimo lygiai buvo. Gal ir pramuš juos.
O stockų pirkti tai nesinori, jei nafta brangs, tai bus recesija visur.
Tikiuosi kad Trumpas taps švelnus ir meilus savaitės viduryje Pasakys ką malonaus

Tegu sako ka nori, marketai ne durni, zino kas ateina, ne veltui topus gale Vasario ant Dow ispjove, O Nasdaq isvis praeitu metu gale Lapkricio. Stai kaip toli i prieki mato smart money kol valstieciai skanduoja "Go baby go!"