Ar nebandei kada gyvenime ieškoti informacijos savarankiškai ? Suomija (po Paragvajaus ) visada buvo lyderė pagal sugebėjimą mobilizuoti visuomenę karui . Statistika susipažinimui :

Lyginant proporcijas:

Šalis Kariai fronte (%) Pastabos
Suomija 60–70 % Viena didžiausių proporcijų pasaulyje
Vokietija 50–60 % Didelė dalis užnugaryje
SSSR 45–55 % Didelis rezervų poreikis

Pabaigai

Tarp 1939 ir 1945 m. Suomijoje tarnavo ~ 750 000–800 000 vyrų.

Šie mobilizuoti vyrai priklausė gimimo kohortoms 1897–1926.

Iš tų kohortų „virš 80 % vyrų“ atsidūrė karo tarnyboje.


Suomijoje karo metu kilo badas , nes nebuvo kam dirbti žemės ūkyje. Ukrainoje pilna vyrų statančių naujus namus oligarhams ir pan. dirbantiem niekam nesvarbius darbus , ar pabėgę iš šalies. Jei būtu toks mobilizavimo procentas kaip Suomijoje, Ukrainos kariuomenė turėtu būti 5-8 mln. dydžio

Ok , puikiai tada ir Europa teisingai tausoja karius, 5000 gins Lietuvą nuo rusų karo metu . Genialu popai , genialu. Reitu dar Lietuvai sumažint kariuomenę ,patausot.

Zele - Jarmako kontoros nuopelnai, 20 punktu:

https://xxtomcooperxx.substack.com/p/checklist-of-ukrainian-failures

"underestimation of Russian offensive potential"

Noreciau ikelti visa, bet jau labai didele paklode...

Taigi tamstai bugaga parašė apie tzu. Jeigu neina sukariauti blitzo, keliais generaliniais mūšiais, karas tampa išteklių planavimo maratonu. tęsiant apie išteklius. vova moka kariams, o babkės baigiasi, turbūt matet pranešimus apie tai, kad rusijos cb išparceliuoja auksą. visokios nacionalizacijos, valstybinės skolos juaniais ir t.t. O koks troškimas, kad nuimtų sankcijas, kurios neveikia... Matyt dėl to, kad trukdo kultūriškai bendradarbiauti.

For those who might have missed it: Zele has decided he’s not going to sack anybody. Read: he remains out of touch with reality, and determined to continue blundering around - with the consequence that Ukraine is going to continue losing this war.

Now, irrespectively how much have Donald and me published about failures of Ukrainian political- and military leadership over the last 1,5 years, there are still lots of readers asking where are the probelms. Thus, have asked Frank to ready something like a checklist.

No problem: here it comes.

***

I. STRATEGIC-LEVEL PLANNING FAILURES

1. No Coherent “Whole-War” Mobilization Concept (2022–2023)

Mobilization waves were improvised, reactive, and politically constrained.

Ukraine never created a sustained industrial-manpower pipeline that could support long-duration positional warfare.

Result: severe replacement deficits by mid-2023; collapse of brigade manpower by late 2024.

***

2. Overreliance on NATO Training Concepts Misaligned with Ukrainian Terrain

NATO brigade-level maneuver doctrine assumes:

air superiority

high ISR saturation

robust logistics

deep fires dominance

Ukraine had none of these conditions.

Result: 2023 counteroffensive failed at the doctrinal level before it began. (Additional massive mistakes in decision-making - see the list below - then prevented recovery of the ZSU).

3. Persistent Mis-assessment of Russian Regeneration Capacity

Kyiv planners assumed Russian losses in 2022 were strategically decisive.

Russia expanded force to 1.3–1.5 million by 2024.

Failure to anticipate force expansion led to:

underestimation of Russian offensive potential

wrong force-allocation choices

failure to prepare fallback belts

***
4. Absence of a Multi-Year Ammunition Production Plan

No strategic domestic production of:

artillery shells

UAV engines

fuel-air munitions

EW systems

Ukraine depended on unpredictable Western stockpiles.

Result: Russia retained a 7:1–15:1 artillery dominance (late 2023–2025).

***

5. No National Air Defense Prioritization Framework

Nasams/IRIS-T/PATRIOT deployment was politically influenced.

Critical nodes (Pavlohrad Chemical Plant, TEC-5, Dnipro rail junctions) were not constantly protected.

Result: Russia systematically degraded Ukrainian energy and ammunition production.

II. OPERATIONAL-LEVEL FAILURES

6. Failure to Sequence Defensive Lines with Depth

Defensive belts (Kupiansk, Bakhmut, Pokrovsk line) were:

shallow

unconnected

inconsistent between brigades

Result: once one node failed, the entire belt collapsed (e.g., Avdiivka, Ocheretyne, Pokrovsk-Mirnograd axis).

***

7. Misallocation of Elite Formations (2022–2024)

Elite air assault brigades (46th, 79th, 80th, 95th) were sent into attritional fights without operational purpose.

Result: catastrophic depletion; elite VDV-like mobile reserve evaporated by 2024.

***

8. Failure to Build a Mobile Reserve

No operational-level reserve to plug Russian breakthroughs.

Russia could create localized 5:1–8:1 manpower ratios.

Result: rapid collapses at:

Lyman (2023)

Avdiivka (2024)

Toretsk-Pokrovsk (2025)

***

9. Inability to Integrate Artillery, UAVs, and EW into a Single Kill-Chain

Ukrainian brigades often used:

stovepiped targeting

uncoordinated ISR feeds

non-standard UAV protocols

Russian forces executed a unified kill-web (Orlan-ZALA-Leer-Lancet-artillery).

Result: Ukrainian brigades were destroyed piecemeal.

***

10. Logistic Corridors Never Hardened

The M-04, M-18, R-66, R-85, and Bakhmut–Kostiantynivka corridors remained:

open

exposed

unmapped for alternate routing

Result: predictable Russian interdiction that repeatedly collapsed ZSU supply.

TACTICAL-LEVEL FAILURES

11. Failure to Adapt to Russian Layered Drone Dominance

ZSU lagged 9–14 months behind Russian adaptations.

Ukraine fielded diverse, non-standard drones; Russia deployed

mass-fabricated FPVs

EW-coordinated loitering munitions

automated targeting swarms

Result: catastrophic Ukrainian vehicle losses from 2023 onward.

***

12. Trench Systems Not Built to Withstand Russian Glide Bombs

No hardened bunkers or deep egress shelters.

Russia’s FAB-250/500/1500 glide bombs shattered fortified zones.

Result: positional defenses made irrelevant.

***

13. Overuse of Pickup-Truck Motorized “Assault Groups”

“McGuyver mechanization” exposed troops:

no armor

predictable routes

zero protection from FPVs

Result: extreme casualty rates and rapid brigade degradation.

COMMAND & CONTROL FAILURES

14. Excessive Brigade Fragmentation

Brigades were split into company-group fragments and misused as “fire brigades.”

No concentration of effect.

Result: brigades broke faster and lost cohesion.

***

15. No Unified Drone/EW Command Structure

Competing internal agencies and “volunteer drone battalions” operated independently.

No centralized doctrine.

Result: failure to contest Russian electromagnetic spectrum control.

***

16. Political Leadership Interference in Operational Decisions

Repeated “hold at all costs” orders:

Severodonetsk (2022)

Bakhmut (2022–2023)

Avdiivka (2023–2024)

Pokrovsk (2024-2025).

Result: destruction of entire seasoned formations.

***

17. Unrealistic Assessments of Manpower Levels

Commanders reported inflated readiness to avoid political consequence.

Result: offensive and defensive plans built on fictional strength numbers.

MANPOWER SYSTEM FAILURES

18. Catastrophic Under-Rotation

Units remained on front lines 180–300+ days with no rotation.

Result: mental collapse, desertion spikes, and combat-ineffective brigades.

***

19. No Strategic Reserve After 2023

Mobilization attrition outpaced training throughput.

Result: by 2025 entire ZSU lacks cohesion or operational capability.

***

20. Degradation of Experienced NCO Corps

Casualties among 2022–2023 NCOs destroyed the backbone of the ZSU.

Replacement NCOs were minimally trained.

Result: collapse of small-unit tactical proficiency.

Hope, this is simple-to-follow enough.

The only conclusion left to add is that by now it’s crystal clear that with Zele/Yermak remaining in power, nothing of this is going change. Not an inch. The reason is that this regime has proven itself as completely incapable of learning any kind of lessons from its own mistakes, and completely incapable of reforming (whether itself, or the system of governance, and the way the armed forces are organised and commanded).

Unsurprisingly, the leadership of the ZSU is as advice-resistant as the that of the Imperial Japanese Navy in the late 1930s and early 1940s. How the latter ended, should be well-known.

This is leading to the assessment that further degeneration of Ukraine’s capability to resist the Russian invasion is a predetermined matter of fact. Current estimates for the ZSU’s ultimate loss of capability to continue resisting - i.e. something like ‘estimated time to total collapse’ - are ranging from 4-6 to 8-10 months.

***
Solonino, Liubarskio ir kitu, pagrinde trampistu, prognoziu terminai ‘estimated time to total collapse’ jau seniai praejo.

***
Tai tiek "prorusisku" izvalgu.

Заблуждение. Yra pozymiu, kad mazeja norinciu pakariauti uz babkes, bet ne "babkes baigiasi". Su babkemis tai galima sakyti "yra nepatogumu" pas ruskius.

Dėl tų "nepatogumų" ir mokesčius tenka rusams pakelti. Zelenskį pradėjo intensyviai spausti sudėti parašus kai rusai pradėjo jausti pasekmes.

Perfrazuojant blusių, Trampas bando apginti vovą nuo kas penkto ukrainiečio.

Ir mokes, ir niekas nepriestaraus, kaip ir pas mus.

---

Zelenski pradejo spausti, kai i Baltuosius rumus atejo putino draugelis. Tai tokie faktai.

Spaudimo intensyvumas tiesiogiai proporcingas rusijos finansinei įtampai. Finansinė padėtis smarkiai suprastės iki pavasario. Todėl protinga tempti gumą ir po to diplomatiškai pasiūlyti susikišti tuos pasiūlymus į oranžinę skylutę arba tam metui, persitarti jau visai kitomis sąlygomis.

Ta prasme "leisti dar pakariauti".

https://www.delfi.lt/news/daily/world/skelbiama-kad-europa-ruosia-savo-taikos-plana-120177122

nebus jokiu pasirashymu, nes jei Zelia pasirashys, tai bus maidanas ir zelia bus pakartas Maidano aikstej

Jeigu putinas nesutiks su besalygine Ukrainos kapituliacija tai gaus sankcijas! Va teip bus!

США готовы ужесточить санкции против РФ, если Кремль не пойдет на перемирие

"Мы предложили России щедрые условия, включая отмену санкций. ...

taigi rubio sake, kad neturi jau ko grieztint

Atpildo valnada ir negailestinga bausme:

Заместитель прокурора Специализированной антикоррупционной прокуратуры (САП) Андрей Синюк, подозреваемый в сливе данных Миндичу, уволился с должности по собственному желанию.