Debesys kaupiasi virš jūrinių linijų, ZIM pirmieji raportavo minusą.
Įdomu kiek ilgai dar laikysis Maersk, Hapag-Lloyd?

Prikabintos bylos

Maersk Q1 ataskaita buvo geguzes 4. Kritimo tiketasi - revenue 10%, rate'ai - >30%, netto rezultatas >60%, taciau viskas kaip ir neblogai. Sakoma, Q1 visada silpnas. Kad 20-22 visiskai nenormali situacija gris i pradini 2018-19 m. lygi turbut abejotina, bet akcijos kursas 10.000 - pakankamai tiketina, o 8000 jau butu visai idomu. Q2 rugpjucio 4.
Is D/S Norden naujienu - produktu spot rate'ai krite 30%, taciau neziurint to - visu laiku rekordinis uzdarbis. Jie perkelia svori is tankeriu ir bulkerius, o sitos gudrios bendroves taktika - jau savaime indikatorius.
Toks pavirsutiniskas zvilgsnis tam kartui, ir tiesa sakant, siuo metu aiskiu ideju negirdeti, tad galima panuobodziauti... ir megautis dividendais.

SPOT kiek tenka bookinti, tai net verkti norisi, visai kelnes nusimovė Maersk.
už kapeikas viską sutinka vežti, tai Q2 rožėm nekvepia..

Nenuostabu. Imones arba seniai uzsipildziusios sandelius, arba dabartiniame kainu lygyje nesiryzta to daryti. Toks jau tas hiperciklinis verslas - daugelis pamirso, kad Maersk metu metais pinigus pradirbdavo.
Ir kaip jie rase, Q3 prognozuojama, kad ekonomika prades po truputi kilti. Tad gali buti, Q2 bus optimalus momentas isigijimui, nors kolkas nerimo nuotaiku nesijaucia. Investuotojai gali dziaugtis ir del to, kad atsispirta pagundai prisipirkti nauju laivu.
Cia toks truputi taktikos, reakcijos greicio ir skonio reikalas - vieniems smagiau pirkti kylanciame trende, kiti ten laukia savu signalu, treti gali toleruoti siek tiek kritimo.

SFL divai po 2 sav.
8.88 nenukerta niekaip

Prikabintos bylos

ZIM blogina prognozę Y2023,
https://investors.zim.com/news/news-details/2023/ZIM-Updates-its-Outlook-for-2023/default.aspx

SA manau ir komentarai atsiras šiek tiek vėliau,
https://seekingalpha.com/news/3987008-zim-integrated-shipping-cuts-full-year-guidance-weighed-by-weak-freight-rates

IB negali pasiūlyti akcijų Short

https://open.spotify.com/episode/5AXWaX5PIUZ5MQCaMztVng?si=9611d0e1ce094dc3&nd=1

What does IMO's revised GHG strategy mean for shipping? The International Maritime Organisation (IMO) aims to adopt net zero by ‘around’ 2050. Listen to the potential next steps, industry and stock implications and the likelihood of achieving this target from UBS Industrials and Capital Goods analysts.

Tokie tokius ir perka, jau lenda gėlytės ir dėl pačio FRHC,
https://www.reuters.com/business/hindenburg-target-freedom-holding-keep-working-with-non-sanctioned-russians-2023-08-17/

Laukiam NETI susijungimo su CADELER jau Q4
bus CADELER išleisti ADR'ai
daugiau info čia,
https://www.eneti-inc.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/Cadeler_Eneti_Investor-Presentation_Final-16-Jun-23.pdf

Vėjo jėgainių instaliavimas reikalaus naujų pajėgumų,
MS+Crowley bendras projektas,
https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/morgan-stanley-infrastructure-partners-crowley-advance-us-wind-energy-301909211.html

Gal bus ir IPO kiek laiko praėjus, pats Crowley yra privat

pats ne angelas Economou kelią bangą prieš aferistus iš Maxim Group, tikrai ne be pagrindo
man tai seniai klausimas kilo kodėl SEC žiūri pro pirštus į visus Maxim bajerius




Joe Brady
Chief Finance Reporter, TradeWinds

This week’s newsletter explores mounting criticism of US investment bank Maxim Group amid share deal spats at Performance Shipping and Imperial Petroleum.

________________

Are we watching the beginning of the end for the gravy train that has chugged down the track for a small pack of mostly Greek shipowners and US investment bank Maxim Group?

A slowly building wave of discontent among disgruntled investors and criticism from industry figures has now morphed into more concrete action from activist investors against two of the Maxim companies: Performance Shipping and Imperial Petroleum.

Among the emerging questions: could the rising objections create trouble not only within the shareholding bases, but also draw the attention of US securities regulators and the Nasdaq exchange to the allegations being raised?

This remains to be seen.

As TradeWinds has reported, one of those critics is high-profile Greek shipowner George Economou, who has blistered the shareholding practices of the Palios-family controlled Performance and — on the strength of his 9.1% holding — demanded to place an independent director on the board.

Also petitioning for board seats, but at Imperial, is Florida-based investment firm Galloway Capital Partners. It has accused principal Harry Vafias of “self-dealing” in his stewardship of the company and questioned whether the board is breaching its fiduciary duty to all shareholders.

Vafias and Performance have defended their management decisions.

The latter has taken the gloves off in its most recent communication with Economou, saying his “record of destroying shareholder value and enriching himself through self-dealing and poor corporate governance speaks for itself”.

The reference is to Economou’s own 15-year journey through the US capital markets at the helm of public companies DryShips, OceanFreight and Ocean Rig, which indeed drew heavy criticism and litigation for his treatment of investors.

The Maxim playbook for Performance, Imperial and companies such as Top Ships, Castor Maritime, OceanPal and others has generally gone like this: conduct large issues of shares and warrants, causing share prices to deteriorate, restore the stock price above the $1 required by Nasdaq through reverse stock splits, and repeat the process.

The companies get cash typically used to buy ships, often from affiliated fleets. The hedge funds and trading shops buy into the deals on profitable terms. And unsuspecting retail investors often get wiped out, complaining of “scams”, as detailed by Streetwise in March.

The resulting depressed share prices usually are of minor consequence to company insiders, who typically hold little of the common stock and supply themselves with “super-voting” shares of preferred stock needed to control votes.

Even in an industry that can be as governance-challenged as shipping, there was bound to be pushback eventually.

But who would have predicted it would come from Economou, the career “bad boy” of shipping in the public markets?

One of the intriguing questions about the Greek magnate’s new role as governance scold is: why Performance?

Some have questioned whether there may be bad blood between Economou and the family of Diana Shipping founder Simeon Palios, whose daughter is Performance’s chairwoman. But Streetwise has not been able to find credible evidence of that.

Indeed, since former Economou banker Anthony Argyropoulos is Performance’s chief financial officer, the opposite might be suggested.

It may be as simple as this: Economou feels Performance’s method of consolidating shareholding power through a January 2022 transaction that exchanged common stock for Series B preferred shares, and then super-voting Series C shares, is a particularly egregious governance violation.

And one he can exploit to his business advantage.

Economou has demanded that the whole share exchange be undone. Performance has defended the practice, saying the opportunity was made available to all holders, and noting that Economou was not even one of them at the time of the transaction.

Still, Economou — who has himself undergone scrutiny from the US Securities & Exchange Commission and faced down shareholder fraud lawsuits — has put the issue front and centre before regulators.

Performance acknowledges as much in one portion of its 5 September response, hitting back at claims from Economou’s Sphinx Investments that it has violated Nasdaq regulations.

“Equally troubling is that Sphinx’s mistaken invocation of Nasdaq Listing Rule 5640 is a transparent attempt to foment regulatory action against the company. To be sure, Nasdaq should not take adverse action against the company based on the long-concluded 2021 exchange offer inasmuch as the offer did not violate any Nasdaq rule,” said the letter from New York securities lawyer Israel David.

“However, the fact that the August 31 letter seeks to sow such an action — which the letter gleefully claims could result in a delisting of the company’s common shares — further highlights that Sphinx is acting in its own interests with no regard for the damage Sphinx is prepared to inflict on the company’s other shareholders.”

Left unsettled is whether the strategy pursued by Economou — and in a quieter way by Galloway in the Imperial case — is providing a blueprint to other investors who feel aggrieved by the actions of the Maxim owners.

But one thing appears clear: Economou is not going away any time soon.
Harry Vafias’ Imperial Petroleum is also in the cross-hairs of an activist investor.

He followed up his first two activist letters of 31 August and 4 September with his strongest one yet on 15 September, demanding the addition of a director, the resignation of four existing directors and a chance to review Performance’s books.

That means a proxy fight at Performance’s next annual shareholders meeting, which the company indicated in its latest reply is not yet scheduled but won’t happen until 2024.

In that latest open letter to Sphinx, the Performance board sounded as much exasperated as wary of where the Greek tycoon may be headed with this.

“Sphinx has done all of this without stating their intentions,” Performance complained.

“We are open to engaging with Sphinx and Mr Economou as we would with any shareholder. However, given they have taken these steps without being clear about their goals and while hiding behind their lawyers, we can only assume the worst.”

There will be many eyes on the sagas unfolding at Performance and, in a quieter way, at Imperial Petroleum.

One can be sure some of those eyes will belong to those who have seen the glitter of gold through the Maxim deals.

NETI pranešimas matau visai buvo praignoruotas,
WTIV kontraktas $350'000/DAY atrodo geriau nei laukta.. laukti vėl gi reikia, iki 1H2027...
https://www.eneti-inc.com/eneti-inc-signs-vessel-reservation-contract-for-newbuild-wtiv/

oi kokie visi netinkintys Jonai...