Ne su google reikia lyginti. O su visa bankų sistema įskaitant bankininkų bezdalų taršą, jų automobilių, pastatų ir visos infrastruktūros. Taip, kaip dabar apmokam bankų išlaikymą, taip su mielu noru BTC naudotojai apmokės BTC reikiamą energiją.

Eilinio Honkongo piliečio suvokimas labai aiškus. Hong Kong is not China. Ir taškas. Ne pirmi protestai. Jie puikiai supranta, kas lauktų, jei visiškai prarastų autonomiją. Pavadink Honkongietį kinu, tai sulauksi didesnės pliūchos nei normalų, ne vatinį, lietuvį pavadinęs ruskiu. O ten tai ne tautiniai dalykai lošia, kaip pas mus. Ten būtent kinų polinė padėtis. Niekas nenori kiniškos tvarkos Honkonge.

Taigi jau buvo pateikta statistika, kad viena bitcoin tranzakcija ekonomikai kainuoja 5000 kart brangiau nei 1 paprasta bankinė tranzakcija. Bet greit pamiršti.

Dėl FED viso pokalbio rašyti neverta, nes svarbiausias būtent mano cituotas sakinys. O antras dalykas pagal svarbu, kad apie tai kalbama. O dar trečias, kad Trumpas irgi kalba.

Tą, ką aš ir daug kitų sako jau seniai BTC yra taikosi į skaitmeninio aukso poziciją, tą pakartoja ir FED. Kam reikia tas supras.

Libra, jei išvys dienos šviesą kels didesnę grėsmę. Nes bus kasdieninio naudojimo valiuta. BTC be gerai veikiančio LN tokios galimybės sumlkiems atsiskaitymams kolkas netinka.

Kas sudarinėjo statistiką ir kas į ją buvo įtraukta, kas lyginta? Dangoraižiai su tūkstančiais darbuotojų buvo skaičiuoti? BTC transakcijos kaina šiuo metu nuo 30 centų.

Kažkodėl joks bankas neduoda daryt pavedimų 5000 kartų pigiau: 0,3/5000 už 0,0006 USD.

https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/ypkp3y/bitcoin-is-still-unsustainable
galėjai pats susirast

Dabar iš naujo pasakok apie "Technologiją-perversmą"

O kiek pinigų turi ekonomika?

Tavo nuorodoje viskas pateikta taip lyg sumažėjus mainintojų kiekiui transakcijos nebevyks. Po metų bus halving, t.y. reikės dvigubai didesnės btc kainos pelningam mainingui. Jei tada kaina nekils- neapsimokės kasti ir tarkim 98% išjungia savo rigus, tai reiškia tą patį darbą atlieka likę 2% ir tie 5000 kartų sumažėja iki kelių. O kol situacija leidžia žmonės uždirba. Ar kažkas yra nuskriaustas? Tu nenori mokėt už transakcija 30cnt( kas yra 5000kart brangiau nei banke)tai ir nelendi į crypto.

Nuskriaustų nėra, nes nauji investuotojai apmoka šio šou tęsimą.

Iš pastarųjų 5 FED vadų, Powellas yra pats silpniausias. Galima teigti, kad turim intelektualinį downtrendą monetarinėje valdžioje. Nėra ką lyginti su volckeriu, greenspanu ar benu.

Dabar, dėl valiutų, pvz. kol JAV valdžia renka mokesčius doleriais, tol chebryte, jei gyvenate JAV, teks iš kažkur gauti (gal užsidirbti? ) dolerių. (su kitomis monetariškai suvereniomis valstybėmis - tas pats) Nemokėsit turto mokesčio - anstolis pasibels į duris, aprašys namą, auto, jachtą ir parduos už dolerius.

Tam tikra prasme teisingas posakis: kai nieko neturi - nieko ir nereikia, bet nepamirškit, kad bėdžių revoliucijos pasauliui atnešė daug kančios.

$15.22 - tai labai negerai.

Niekaip nepramusa $15, tai be galo negerai. Netycia gali pasiekti ir $16.

C# nervinsis.

Kvailys Powell susipyko su protu, bet tai juk nieko nuostabaus, juk kvailys!

Svelniai tariant nusisnekejo. Valstijose valdzioje vieni pusgalviai.

6 metai drocinimo prie grafiku - ar jau kyla ? Gal jau 50 pasieke ? Jau atejo sidabro amzius ? Jau siandien ?

Jeigu zmogu priverstai uz dyka taip daryt, tai butu galima sakyt kad tai baisus nusikaltimas ir grubus zmogaus teisiu pazeidimas, bet stai - siais laikais randas pridurku kurie tai daro savo noru

Gatvinis zargonelis ir pamokos apie doleeeeri.

Ka gi, ne visi sugeba C#. Nesinervink ir tu uzdirbsi viena diena, nereikia melo pilti del to geresnis treideris nebusi.

Mokykis is sugebanciu.

Sekmes.

"Nesinervink ir tu uzdirbsi viena diena"

Nea, as nesinervinu del tavo uzdarbio, ka tu ten UK darai, PC kasoje sedi, indus restorane plauni ?

Del treiderio galiu nuramint - niekad juo netapsi

Jei pats neuzdirbi - negalvok, kad kiti neuzdirba.

Isverstaskuris Bufetavas.

Warren Buffett's Giant Silver Trad[/b]e

https://www.gurufocus.com/news/906807/warren-buffetts-giant-silver-trade-

Nu ka tu cia muilini uzdirbinetojau kai pirkinejai sidabra po 20 ir daugiau, visus tavo postus is istorijos istraukt galima. O kadangi tu kaip ir visi rinkos genijai nededa stopu, tai tu greiciausiai ir saskaita ne viena degines esi ant popieriaus.

Rinka yra ziaurus dalykas, nes tokie grand net patys sau nesugeba prisipazint kad jie luzina. Cia kaip tie kaziko narkomanai, kurie ten 'ant savu', arba 'mazam pliuse'

Laikas Grand pas psichiatrus, nuo losiminiu priklausomybiu gydymo. Pokeryje kiek pamenu irgi tu ten 'uzdirbi'

A Whale Is Accumulating Silver Futures

https://www.zerohedge.com/news/2019-07-11/whale-accumulating-silver-futures

Why the trail of evidence leads to China
In 2012, I was speaking at a conference in New York at which a number of silver mining minnows had stands in the hope of attracting investors. I visited all of them to establish the answer to a simple question: how did they ship their silver out, who paid them, and when?

The reason for asking this question was there were allegations going the rounds about the dark deeds of JPMorgan manipulating the silver futures market. That the silver market was open to manipulation by the big banks there was little doubt, and JPMorgan was definitely a major force in the silver market. By not appearing to take credible allegations seriously, Comex and the CFTC as regulator gave the impression they were colluding with JPMorgan, giving the whole story an extra spin.

The assumption that JPMorgan could simply ride roughshod over the CFTC and Comex rulebook was really the weakness in the conspiracy theories. We are all aware of the crony capitalism between banks and regulators, but there are limits. Bending the interpretation of the rules is one thing. Flagrantly breaking them to create false markets is another.

However, there was little doubt JPMorgan dominated trading in Comex silver futures, and my feeling was they were acting for a legitimate client instead of its own trading book. This was confirmed when Blythe Masters, then head of global commodities at JPMorgan and a hate-figure for silver conspiracy theorists, a month earlier than the New York conference gave an interview where she clearly stated that JPMorgan acted only for clients and did not run directional positions as principal.

The outcry from conspiracy theorists was predictable, but I found it impossible to believe that Masters would give an interview, which appeared to be for the main purpose of refuting the rumours, and then tell a barefaced lie. When an interviewee says before answering, “that is a great question” you can be reasonably sure it was pre-agreed, so is an important and considered revelation. The recording of the interview confirms this is what happened.

The question then was what role was JPMorgan playing in the market? They had inherited their silver business from the acquisition of Bear Sterns in 2008 and continued to develop it. And there was no doubt that such a large investment bank had greater clout than Bear Sterns to manage silver positions. Given Blythe Master’s unequivocal denial that JPMorgan was running a trading position on its own book, it must have been acting for one very large client, and that was the evidence I was looking for at the New York conference.

The silver miners all told the same story. When they had enough doré to ship, a specialist from Glencore would assess and certify the value of the silver content and arrange for it to be shipped to a refiner. Glencore was working with JPMorgan, and the silver miner would be paid as soon as the doré was being shipped, enabling the miner to cover its day-to-day costs. Using the doré as collateral, JPMorgan would cover the price risk by selling Comex silver futures or possibly by selling silver on the LBMA for forward delivery. This was why Masters could truthfully say JPMorgan did not take a directional position.

We should bear in mind that Glencore’s assessors would also be assessing the silver content of base metal ores, because more than half of silver mine production is a by-product of base metal processing, and in total involves very large amounts of silver. The sale of large amounts of futures contracts would follow to offset price risk.

This is not the whole story, raising the question as to the doré’s destination. At the New York conference, there was no consensus among the silver miners. But at that time, as it still does today, China had a major position in the global silver market. Furthermore, China had invested in processing and refining facilities when environmental factors led to the closure of rival facilities in western nations, such as Canada. It was therefore almost certain that a big slug of the doré was bound for China, which not only had ample low-cost silver refining capacity, but had also invested heavily in base metal refining for the extraction of silver as well.

All purchases of silver imported into China are the responsibility of the Peoples’ Bank of China, and that would be JPMorgan’s underlying client, not Glencore. Given the standing and resources of the Peoples Bank, and the leading positions of JPMorgan and Glencore in their respective industries, it is easy to envisage the existence of this high-level partnership and the importance of confidentiality.

I could then conclude my own conspiracy theory, which seemed far more likely than the others swirling around: JPMorgan extended the miners credit against the collateral of doré shipments, the price risk being covered by selling futures on Comex and forwards on the LBMA. This was not JPMorgan as a principal, but on behalf of China’s central bank. China had a vested interest in keeping the price as low as possible, which is the natural consequence of this hedging activity.

In their conspiracy theories, frustrated silver bulls were missing the one obvious conclusion confirmed by the Blythe Masters interview, that JPMorgan was, and probably still is, working for the Chinese central bank as their client. China is the whale in the market, which explains why, in Chart 2 above, we see the lack of correlation between the largest four traders and the second four going back over a decade. Bear in mind also that the commitment of trader’s reports covering Comex are not the whole story. Forward trades in London on the LBMA are a significantly larger market and JPMorgan operates its own vaults in London as well.

Switching dealings between OTC forwards and regulated futures makes it very difficult to analyse silver markets. Analysing Comex is like observing the dog’s tail and not seeing the dog. The result is China has managed to import over half her silver needs at suppressed prices. By using both markets it appears that JPMorgan has discharged this role skilfully for the Peoples’ Bank, and it also explains why the regulators were unable to bring them to account, despite evidence that JPMorgan’s actions may have been suppressing the silver price: strictly speaking, there was no wrongdoing within Comex’s rules.

The change from bear to bull
Price management at the behest of the Peoples’ Bank, within certain limits, is a reasonable objective and the bedrock of all large client/broker relationships. In that context, the broker is often given a degree of discretion. Regular liaison between JPMorgan’s dealers and those of the client would be normal, perhaps monthly or quarterly to review both progress and objectives. This allows the broker to act on the clients’ behalf on a semi-discretionary basis within agreed guidelines.

In this case, the client (i.e. the Peoples’ Bank) would be an ongoing buyer of physical silver. In the past, silver prices have been suppressed in the futures market by selling enough futures to cover doré and silver-bearing base metal ore shipments. Doing business this way would have been a significant benefit to China.

None of this explains why a substantial long position appears to have now materialised on Comex. Instead of selling futures to suppress the price, our market whale appears to have turned buyer; buying enough to cover China’s annual silver imports, the equivalent of about 43,000 Comex contracts. Clearly, the new strategy is to hedge against rising prices instead of suppressing the silver price. Given this new development, one would have thought that the other seven large traders would have tried to limit their silver shorts and at least keep an even book. There are several reasons why they may not have not felt the need to do so:

There are ample quantities of bullion in the vaults in London and Comex depositories, currently totalling 1.66 years’ worth of mine supply, unlike gold where the underlying bullion stock is very small relative to the paper contracts based upon them.

They appear to be unaware of China’s actions and motives. They may not even be aware of the existence of this long position. If they are aware of it, they may think it is just a technical long, against a short in London’s OTC market.

With global commercial demand declining due to the economic slow-down, they probably feel relaxed about the price outlook for silver, which they will regard as an industrial metal. Base metals show little sign of entering a bull market.

Therefore, with the Swaps category only moderately oversold (net short 12,735 contracts) and the Managed Money category only average overbought (net long 21,923 contracts), the other seven largest traders are likely to feel individually comfortable with their short positions, unaware of the extent to which their fellow traders are also short. What they fail to realise is that they are the shorts against the one largest trader who is long.

Ka gi - kylam.

Commerzbank: ETF Holdings Of Silver Up Sharply Since Start Of June

https://www.kitco.com/news/2019-07-15/Gold-Silver-Precious-Metals-Daily-News-Briefs.html